$400 million, gone in an instant

Ask AI · Does the Bridge-Blasting Operation Cross a Red Line Under International Law?

Local time on April 4, U.S. President Donald Trump posted on a social media platform, once again issuing a tough stance on the Iran issue. He warned that if the U.S. demands were not met, “within 48 hours” further action could be taken. He also said that in a large-scale attack targeting Tehran, many of Iran’s “military leadership” were killed.

Trump previously said that Iran would be given 10 days to reach an agreement or to open the Strait of Hormuz.

In addition, the U.S. military recently carried out two precision strikes, about an hour apart, on the Beyik overpass that connects Tehran and Karaj. The airstrikes caused casualties numbering in the hundreds, including several injured civilians who were picnicking in the river valley under the bridge on Iran’s “Nature Day.”

This is the first time the U.S. military has turned its sights on Iran’s main civilian infrastructure since more than a month of joint military action by the United States and Israel against Iran. The action took place only a few hours after Trump delivered a nationwide televised address and threatened to “blast Iran back to the Stone Age.”

Trump then posted on social media to clearly lay out the next strike sequence: “The bridge is next, and then the power plant.” A well-known expert in international law of armed conflict publicly pointed out that this warning, under both international law and the framework of U.S. law, amounts to a war crime against another country.

Local time on April 3, 2026, the bridge in Karaj, Iran, damaged in the airstrike operation. Photo/Visual China

Blasting the Bridge

Judging by historical precedents, strategies of pressuring opponents by bombing civilian infrastructure have a very low success rate. During NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, it destroyed the bridges in Novi Sad over the Danube River. This did not shake the Milošević regime; instead, it strengthened the Serb population’s resolve to resist, and later sparked extensive disputes over international law. During the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. military also struck bridges and infrastructure, without breaking Iraq’s resolve to resist. Ultimately, regime change was achieved by advancing with ground forces, not by forcing the outcome through airstrikes.

The U.S. side’s rationale for blasting the bridge was that the bridge was a “planned military corridor” for Iran’s missile and drone supply chain. Missile parts were secretly transported over the bridge in large crates and moved to western launch sites for assembly. Iran denied this.

The person in charge of the Karaj North Expressway Construction Company, which was responsible for building the bridge, said publicly that the bridge had absolutely no military use, and there were no military bases nearby either.

After five weeks of intensive airstrikes, the United States failed to force Tehran to make concessions on nuclear issues or Hormuz issues. The strategic stalemate pushed Washington to look for “middle options”—targets that could generate public hardship while also providing vague military pretexts. This Middle East “highest bridge,” costing about $400 million, became the perfect target.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Aragchi commented on the bridge bombing, saying that strikes on civilian facilities—including unfinished bridges—“will not force Iranians to surrender; they only convey the failure and moral collapse of an enemy thrown into chaos.” He claimed, “Every bridge and building will be rebuilt stronger; what cannot be restored is America’s international standing.”

Unexpectedly, criticism of the bridge bombing came not only from the Iranian government. Even opposition figures living abroad—such as Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former king—strongly called on Trump and Netanyahu to “retain the civilian infrastructure needed by the Iranian people to rebuild the country,” and said plainly that such attacks serve no purpose.

Crash

Less than two days after Iran’s bridge was blown up, the conflict took another military turn: on the same day, a U.S. Air Force F-15E fighter-bomber and an A-10 attack aircraft were both shot down. At the same time, two Black Hawk helicopters participating in the search and rescue were also hit by Iranian fire, injuring the crews, but the helicopters safely returned to base.

On April 5, Iranian official media released photos and videos of the U.S. aircraft involved in the rescue operation that had been shot down. The same day, The New York Times reported that the missing U.S. pilot had been rescued and sent to Kuwait for treatment. During the rescue, the U.S. military destroyed two “stranded” transport aircraft carrying out the rescue mission.

The F-15E that was shot down is a two-seat aircraft. One crew member was successfully rescued by U.S. special forces, while the other has been missing since then; the Pentagon has notified the congressional armed forces committees. During the search and rescue operation, Iranian state television broadcast a reward announcement, calling on the public to help “capture the enemy pilots.” Iranian parliament speaker Kalibaf mocked on social media: “After 37 times of ‘defeating Iran,’ this ‘war with no strategy’ has been downgraded from ‘regime change’ to ‘is there anyone who can help us find our pilots?’”

The last time a U.S. fighter jet was shot down during combat was on April 8, 2003, when a U.S. Air Force aircraft was hit by an Iraqi surface-to-air missile over Baghdad—exactly 23 years ago. This timing gives the crash event a strategic meaning beyond a single tactical loss.

Just a few days earlier, U.S. Central Command Commander General Cooper had publicly said that Iran’s air defense system had been basically destroyed. Trump himself also claimed, “Iran has no air-defense equipment at all. Their radars have been 100% eliminated. We are a force that they can’t stop.”

Beyond the crash incident, what worries ordinary Americans even more is the rising number of deaths and injuries. As of April 3, the Pentagon released casualty data for more than a month of military operations: 13 combat fatalities and 365 wounded, including 247 from the Army, 63 from the Navy, 19 from the Marine Corps, and 36 from the Air Force. And since the conflict began, at least 16 MQ-9 Reaper drones have been shot down over Iran; additionally, 3 F-15E jets were previously hit by friendly fire in Kuwait, reflecting severe pressures on battlefield command and coordination.

In addition, the U.S. military has not deployed any ground forces to date; all strikes rely on air power and long-range missiles. Under these constraints, the record of 13 fatalities, 365 wounded, and the downing of two aircraft in the same day points to a reality that cannot be ignored: Iran’s air-defense and counterattack capabilities are not as poor as the Pentagon’s public assessment suggests, and the U.S. assumption of “war without contact” is being revised by real combat.

Cracks

Along with the spike in U.S. casualties and the continuing escalation of the Hormuz crisis, Trump’s diplomatic predicament has also become increasingly exposed.

In recent days, Trump wrote on social media: “Give it a little more time, and we can easily open the Strait of Hormuz, take the oil, and make a fortune.” The logic behind this is that the U.S.’s own dependence on the Strait of Hormuz’s oil is limited; the “shale revolution” has already made the United States energy self-sufficient. The main harm from a blockade of the strait falls on economies such as Europe, Japan, South Korea, and India, which are highly dependent on Gulf energy. Based on this judgment, Trump’s stance is to demand that Europe must step in to protect the strait’s passage and not let the U.S. pay the bill alone.

Trump has continued to publicly pressure European allies, urging them to “summon the courage that came late,” so that they can “take back the oil themselves.” This statement enraged countries such as the UK, France, and Germany, intensifying cracks within NATO that were already severe.

However, Trump’s logic has a premise that he himself seems to have forgotten—ally relationships are mutual.

Over the past two years, Trump’s systematic depletion of Europe has unfolded in multiple layers. On tariffs, he imposed substantial additional tariffs on goods shipped from the EU to the U.S., dragging transatlantic trade relations into a confrontational trajectory. On the Greenland issue, he openly declared his interest in Danish territory, putting the sovereignty of an NATO member state in the position of a bargaining chip. On the Ukraine issue, he bypassed European allies and engaged directly with Moscow, treating Europe’s core security concerns as an exchange condition in U.S.-Russia negotiations. When British Prime Minister Starmer was asked by reporters whether Washington is still a British ally, he deliberately avoided the question and only said, “Our job is to make decisions based on the national interests of the United Kingdom.”

Now, when shipping interests in the Strait of Hormuz need someone to step forward to provide cover, Trump suddenly remembered to demand that European allies “step in,” only to find that they are absent as a group. French President Macron believes that a plan to force open the strait by military force is “unrealistic” and would only expose cargo ships stuck in the strait to Iranian firepower. But behind this is a deeper logic, likely not just tactical prudence. Trump’s anger at European allies is real, and Europe’s coldness toward Trump is also real. Both are direct reflections of the consequences of U.S. policy toward Europe over the past two years.

The Cost

The destruction of the bridge, the fall of the F-15, and the disputes between the U.S., Europe, and its allies form three cross-sections of the fifth week of the U.S.-Iran conflict—and they all point to a core question that still has no answer: Can the United States, without deploying ground forces and without accepting political compromises, force a country with deep resistance resolve to give in using only air power?

The logic of “forcing by bombing and pressure” has been tested repeatedly—from the Vietnam War to the Kosovo War—and its success rate has always been far lower than decision-makers expected. And when the target is civilian bridges and water treatment facilities, the logic’s efficiency would further deteriorate, because civilian suffering does not translate into pressure on the government at home; instead, it strengthens hatred toward external enemies.

According to data cited by Al Jazeera Television from information provided by Iran, Iran’s number of war deaths has now exceeded 2,076, with 26,500 injured, and more than 600 schools and education centers destroyed. These figures are continuing to feed Iran’s “resistance narrative” of the Islamic Republic.

After five weeks, the boundaries of the battlefield have also disappeared, and the negotiation channel has not been fully opened. From the bombed bridge to the wreckage of the F-15, the costs have already far exceeded any side’s estimates.

Author: Zhu Zhaoyi

Editor: Xu Fangqing