From Simple to Complex: The Financial Puzzle Behind Vanke's Yu Liang Incident

On the surface, this is a simple story of corporate personnel changes—an old veteran retiring and a newcomer taking over. But as we peel back the layers of this seemingly straightforward story, we discover a far more complex financial black hole than expected. The retirement of Vanke’s former Chairman Yu Liang and his subsequent disappearance are just a microcosm of this intricate puzzle.

Three Major Anomalous Signals: Why Did the Chairman Exit Quietly?

A veteran who has diligently worked at the company for 30 years should have a farewell filled with applause and flowers. However, Yu Liang’s retirement was unusually low-key—no farewell party, no flowers, only a casual thank-you note in the official announcement. This starkly contrasts with the grand scene at Wang Shi’s retirement. This is the first abnormal signal.

Yu Liang is a marathon enthusiast, never missing the annual Vanke internal New Year’s marathon, and habitually posts summaries and reflections on social media afterward. But this New Year’s, that habit suddenly stopped—Yu Liang did not post any related social media updates. This seemingly trivial detail is regarded by industry insiders as the second warning sign, hinting that some unusual changes are underway.

Even more striking is the bizarre nature of the top management appointment. According to Vanke’s tradition, the chairman position is usually filled by an internal professional manager—this was Wang Shi’s core competitive advantage, built on a team of seasoned, trained management. But after Yu Liang’s departure, the successor was a representative from Shenzhen Metro’s state-owned assets. This abrupt personnel change became the third abnormal signal, sparking speculation about internal power shifts within Vanke.

Behind the Passive Resignation: Investigation Deepens Step by Step

Before the news of Yu Liang’s disappearance surfaced, industry rumors suggested his retirement was a “passive resignation” aimed at cooperating with an investigation. According to Caixin, Yu Liang had already gradually stepped back from daily management a year before his official resignation, further confirming these suspicions.

But what exactly was Yu Liang cooperating with in the investigation? Clues may stem from an old report from two years ago. In 2024, a company called “Yantai Bairun Real Estate” reported to relevant authorities that Vanke had accumulated over 100 billion yuan in tax evasion and tax leakage over the past decade. The report detailed specific tax evasion methods, including income concealment, false cost reporting, profit compression, and financial data falsification.

Even more astonishingly, the report revealed a complex profit transfer mechanism involving financial instruments.

The 10% Annualized Return Game: How Profits Are Transferred Offshore

Vanke’s financial operation model is ingeniously designed. The logic is as follows:

First, Vanke’s financial platform “Pengjin” lends its wholly owned subsidiary “Shenzhen Vanke Financial Advisory Co., Ltd.” idle funds within the group at an extremely low interest rate (less than 2% annually). Then, Pengjin lends these funds to employees at a high annualized rate of up to 10%, ostensibly for participation in “co-investment” plans.

But a key step is hidden here—these high-interest loans to employees are not directly invested in Vanke projects. Instead, they are “guided” to purchase wealth management products issued by “Boxiang Shuntai,” established by former Vanke employees. These products promise an annualized return of up to 20%, making them highly attractive.

Subsequently, Boxiang Shuntai invests the raised funds back into Vanke’s own real estate projects. As a result, the profits from projects fully owned by Vanke must go through multiple layers of distribution—first to Boxiang Shuntai, then to pay interest to Pengjin, and finally to fulfill the promised returns to employees.

Calculations show that a real estate project with a profit scale of 1 billion yuan could “skim off” nearly 500 million yuan just through these three parties’ distributions. These funds, through interest spreads, management fees, and asset transfers at low prices, ultimately flow into offshore accounts controlled by senior executives.

The “Multi-Party Win” During Real Estate Upturn and Risks in Downturn

During the boom cycle of real estate, this model appears to achieve a “multi-party win”—employees earn interest spreads through differential rates, financial platforms collect management fees, and executives enjoy hidden dividends via complex financial structures. The entire system seems to operate smoothly, with each party gaining.

However, this sophisticated financial architecture’s risk resistance is far less than expected. Once the real estate market enters a downturn, the fragility of the structure quickly becomes apparent. Employees cannot obtain the expected returns from projects, the promised 20% annualized yield becomes a paper promise, and high-interest debts are real. Every link in the financial chain faces the risk of rupture.

Deeper still is the possibility that the original intent of this mechanism was to transfer profits that should belong to the listed company outward through complex financial intermediaries. When the real estate market prospers, this process remains hidden; when it declines, this “black hole” becomes clearly visible.

Vanke’s Deep Debt Troubles Are Closely Tied to the Flow of Profits

Today, Vanke is mired in debt, with its financial situation raising concerns. Could this be related to the profits that have been diverted over the years through complex financial means? The likely answer is yes.

When the company transfers profits that should be used for debt repayment, investment, or reserves via various financial tools, the cash flow on the listed company’s books inevitably diminishes. As external financing tightens and the real estate market declines, the consequences of this “self-draining” become fully apparent.

Yu Liang’s disappearance, the investigation’s deepening, and the exposure of the whistleblower’s content all point to a systemic review of this complex financial system. This involves not only pursuing specific violations but also a profound reflection on corporate governance and financial risk prevention mechanisms.

For the entire real estate and financial sectors, the Vanke incident serves as a mirror—it reminds us that behind any seemingly simple business model, there may be hidden complex risks; that any “multi-party win” financial innovation must withstand the test of a down cycle. How this storm will ultimately unfold, and the further actions by markets and regulators, remain subjects of ongoing attention.